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Abstract—We present a scenario and storyline that are part
of a framework to evaluate adaptive security in the Internet of
Things, also denoted as the IoT. The successful deployment of
the IoT depends on ensuring security and privacy, which need
to adapt to the processing capabilities and resource use of the
IoT. We develop a scenario for the assessment and validation of
context-aware adaptive security solutions for the IoT in eHealth.
We first present the properties to be fulfilled by a scenario
to assess the adaptive security solutions for eHealth. We then
develop a home scenario for patients with chronic diseases using
biomedical sensors. This scenario is then used to create a storyline
for a chronic patient living at home. [tbd.: update]
Keywords—Internet of Things; assessment scenarios; eHealth
systems; adaptive security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Body Sensor Networks (WBSNs) improve the
efficiency of eHealth applications by monitoring vital signs of
a patient using low-rate communication media and constitute
an important part of the Internet of Things (IoT) by bringing
humans into the IoT. However, the successful deployment of
the IoT depends on ensuring security and privacy, which need
to adapt to the processing capabilities and resource use of
the IoT. To evaluate such adaptive mechanisms we introduced
evaluation scenarios specifically designed for applications in
eHealth and proposed an evaluation framework [1]. This
evaluation framework is extended here with a quantitative
component that allows to put numbers on the quality of
security solutions.
The “Adaptive Security for Smart Internet of Things in
eHealth” (ASSET) project researches and develops risk-based
adaptive security methods and mechanisms for IoT that will
estimate and predict risk and future benefits using game
theory and context awareness [2]. The security methods and
mechanisms will adapt their security decisions based upon
those estimates and predictions.
The main application area of ASSET is health and wel-
fare. Health organisations may deploy IoT-based services to
enhance traditional medical services and reduce delay for
treatment of critical patients. A case study will evaluate the
developed technologies for adaptive security using both sim-
ulation and implementation in a testbed based upon realistic
cases. Blood pressure, electrocardiogram (ECG) and heart rate
values will be gathered from patients and made anonymous.
The sensor data will be stored in different biomedical sensor
nodes that are capable of communicating with any of the
following connectivity options ZigBee, Wi-Fi, 3G, GPRS,
Bluetooth, and 802.15.4. For instance, a smartphone with
a suitable transceiver could act as an access point between
sensor nodes and a medical centre. For the evaluation in
the case study, we developed a set of scenarios to assess
the adaptive security models, techniques, and prototypes that
will be introduced in ASSET. These scenarios describe the
foreseeable interactions between the various actors and the
patient monitoring system based on IoT.
In computing, a scenario is a narrative: it most commonly
describes foreseeable interactions of user roles and the techni-
cal system, which usually includes computer hardware and
software. A scenario has a goal, a time-frame, and scope.
Alexander and Maiden [3] describe several types of scenarios,
such as stories, situations (alternative worlds), simulations,
story boards, sequences, and structures. Scenarios have inter-
action points and decision points where the technology under
consideration can interact with the scenario. This means that
the scenarios developed for a particular situation have to take
into consideration the technologies used by the different actors.
The importance of scenarios in the assessment of security
solutions has been discussed in the literature [4], [5]. This
work focuses on the development of scenarios that support
the evaluation of adaptive security techniques for the IoT in
eHealth.
[updated.] In this paper, we develop a framework for the
assessment of adaptive security solutions on the basis of secu-
rity and Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. In Section II
the requirements and the proposed assessment framework are
described including metrics that make this framework quan-
tifiable in order to enable comparison of various situations.
We define the properties that must be fulfilled by a scenario
to assess adaptive security schemes for eHealth. We show
the interaction between the scenarios, the threats, and the
countermeasures in a global assessment framework for the
ASSET project.
In Section III, we describe the extension of a previously
developed generic system model, which is used for the struc-
ture of the scenarios in Section III-A with different QoS
requirements, contexts and adaptive security methods and
mechanisms. These scenarios, first proposed by Leister et al.
[6], include a patient monitored at home, a hospital scenario,
and an emergency scenario. These scenarios are reviewed and
their adequacy to the evaluation of adaptive security techniques
for the IoT is analysed. We propose a storyline that can support
requirements analysis, as well as adaptive security design,
implementation, evaluation, and testing.
Further, in Section IV, we present storylines for both the
home monitoring scenario and the hospital scenario. These
storylines are used in Section V to show how our framework
can be applied to selected episodes of the home scenario and
storyline. In Section VI we show how to use our framework
in the context of adaptive security as defined by Abie and Bal-
asingham [2]. Finally, Section VII offers concluding remarks
and future prospects.
II. ADAPTIVE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Designing the scenarios is of central significance for the
ASSET project. They depict the operation of systems, here ap-
plied to IoT-based eHealth systems, in the form of actions and
event sequences. In addition, scenarios facilitate the detection
of threats and the identification of the solutions to cope with
these threats. In a scenario-based assessment, a set of scenarios
is developed to convey the design requirements. With regard
to the specific objectives of IoT-based systems, the scenarios
should capture two types of requirements:
1) Security requirements: Novel adaptive security and pri-
vacy mechanisms and methods are required that adapt
to the dynamic context of the IoTs and changing threats
to them. Thus, the scenarios should be generic enough
to capture the security needs for the data processed and
exchanged within a patient monitoring system. This is
particularly challenging because this system encompasses
multiple networking technologies, data, users, and appli-
cations, addressing varying processing capabilities and
resource use.
2) Quality of service requirements: Unlike many traditional
applications and services relying on communication net-
works, eHealth applications have stringent QoS require-
ments. Items such as the communication delay, the quality
of the communication channels, and the lifetime of the
self-powered sensor nodes are crucial context parameters
that have significant impact on the safety of the patient.
The scenarios should highlight the needs in terms of QoS
requirements and illustrate the dynamic interplay between
these needs and the security requirements. [ato:tbd:
Add example of how QoS and security requirements
influence each other.]
A. The ASSET Evaluation Framework
[updated.] The ASSET scenarios appear as a component
of an assessment framework that will serve to improve the
applicability of the security techniques proposed in the frame
Fig. 2: Illustration of context changes during the execution of
a storyline.
of the project. The other components of the assessment frame-
work are (i) a set of threats describing the actions that violate
the security requirements, (ii) a set of security solutions that
mitigate the aforementioned threats, and (iii) a set of system
states representing the dynamic context in which the patient
monitoring system operates. Fig. 1 illustrates the ASSET
assessment framework. The security and QoS requirements
are the output of the scenario design activity. In other terms,
the scenarios should give information about the set of reliable
states from the security requirements, here denoted as S , and
the set of states where the QoS is acceptable, here denoted as
Q. The intersection of these sets is the set of desirable states,
denoted in Fig. 1(a) by D (Desirable), where the security and
QoS requirements are balanced.
One of the intrinsic features of the ASSET scenarios is that
the sets of security requirements and QoS requirements could
vary in time and space. This will make the threats and the
security solutions also vary in time and space. Threats are
viewed as potential events that may generate insecure system
states while countermeasures are intended to thwart the effects
of these threats. The realization of a threat reduces the set of
secure states in the scenario of interest and affects the QoS
requirements. This is represented by the region I (Impact) in
Fig. 1(b). This region represents a set of states that will not
fulfil the security or QoS requirements if a threat is realized.
The countermeasures or controls[7] will reduce the likelihood
of a threat being realized or the impact of a realized threat and
hence the size of the set of potentially insecure states. Fig. 1(c)
illustrates the effect of the countermeasures through the Region
M (Mitigate). This region extends the set of secure states.
Nonetheless, the countermeasures can have a negative effect
on the QoS, represented by the region C (Cost), consisting
of power, processing, memory, communication overhead, and
cases where QoS requirements might not be fulfilled.
The elements of this representation will be used in the
scenario based assessment of adaptive security schemes. The
scenarios allow for evaluating the potential of controls to
minimise the effect of threats in a given context.
For adaptive security solutions, the proposed protection
techniques will vary in time and space according to the
context. This is not conveyed by the scenario representation
of Fig. 1. To overcome this issue, we derive a set of storylines
from the ASSET scenarios. These can be viewed as a sequen-
tial application of the scenarios in a way that the selection of
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Fig. 1: The ASSET assessment framework.
the appropriate countermeasures must take into consideration:
• The space transition between scenarios. Space encom-
passes much useful information that affect the security
decision-making process. For instance, the location of the
WBSN might increase/decrease its vulnerability. More-
over, mobility introduces significant challenges including
horizontal and vertical handover management.
• The time transitions between scenarios (with its im-
plications on the context). The time interplay between
the threats and countermeasures has a substantial and
dynamic impact on the environment where the patient
monitoring system is deployed. The amount of energy,
memory, and processing resources are crucial parameters
from the QoS perspective and the security solutions
have to adapt accordingly. In addition, the state of the
communication channel and the proper temporal interplay
in all these contexts are important in the selection of the
appropriate security decisions.
Fig. 2 illustrates the evolution of the storyline and the un-
derlying impact on the context. Of course, the sequence of
scenarios forming a storyline should be consistent so that it
translates a real-case situation.
B. Making the ASSET Framework Quantifiable
[new.] Assessing the qualities of a given system state can
be done by means of subjective data from human assessors
and by means of objective data from measurements. Our goal
is to establish an estimation function that takes measured data
as input and which is a preliminary to implement functionality
for adaptive security. To establish such an estimation function
the assessment from subjective data is used to calibrate a
function that uses objective and measured data as input.
Similar methodology has been used to estimate the quality
of streamed video [8]. In the following we present how to
assess a given system state by using human assessors.
To make the ASSET framework quantifiable we define a
real function 0 ≤ q(system state) ≤ 1 that shall express
the degree of how well the requirements are fulfilled in the
system state in question. A low value, below a given threshold,
denotes that the system state in question is unacceptable, while
a value close to 1 denotes that most requirements are well
fulfilled.
The function q is composed of two types of inputs: 1) se-
curity requirements that need to be fulfilled, expressed in the
function qS ; 2) degree of fulfilled QoS requirements and costs
that occur due to mitigation costs for threats are expressed in
the function qQ. The function q is then composed of a product
of all partial functions of qi∈{S,Q}: q =
∏
i qi
wi . The weights
are real numbers 0 ≤ wi < ∞ and express the importance
of a single qi, large values indicating more importance. A
weight wi = 1 is considered neutral. The importance of each
parameter is defined by the assessor according to the nature
of the requirement before assessing the qi values.
The above definition has the disadvantage that the resulting
q is sensitive to the number k of factors qi that are used to
define it. To mitigate this we propose to replace the weights
by vi = wi∑k
j=1 wj
resulting in qˆi = qi
wi∑k
j=1
wj . Thus, the value
q is expressed by:
q =
∏
i
qˆi =
∏
i
qi
wi∑k
j=1
wj (1)
1) Security Requirements: Define GS = (S \ I) ∪ M as
a set where all security requirements are fulfilled or threats
mitigated. For security requirements j outside GS we define
a deviation from the ideal requirements and a normalised
distance dSj : 0 ≤ dSj ≤ 1 according to a suitable metric to
denote how far the current requirement is from ideal fulfilment.
We set dSj = 1 when deviations cannot be tolerated. Thus,
we define the following function:
qSj =
 1 if requirement ∈ GS1− dSj if requirement /∈ GS
0 if deviation intolerable
2) QoS Requirements: Define GQ = Q \ C as a set where
all QoS requirements are fulfilled and possible effects from
the mitigation are tolerable. For QoS requirements j outside
GQ we define a deviation from the ideal requirements and a
normalised distance dQj : 0 ≤ dQj ≤ 1 according to a suitable
metric to denote how far the current requirement is from ideal
fulfilment. We set dQj = 1 when QoS requirements are not
fulfilled (cf. availability) or costs cannot be tolerated. Thus,
we define the following function:
qQj =
 1 if requirement ∈ GQ1− dQj if requirement /∈ GQ
0 if QoS properties intolerable
3) Mitigation Costs: Besides the effect on QoS there might
be other costs implied by mitigation, e.g., real costs in payroll
or material, changes to the environment, costs for the patient,
virtual costs for lower Quality of Experience, and so on.
Unacceptable costs are included in the area C. For costs
outside C we define relative costs on a normalised scale
dC : 0 ≤ dC ≤ 1. We define the following function:
qC =
 1 if costs neglectable1− dC if costs /∈ C
0 if costs ∈ C
C. Assessment to define the qi values
To aid human assessors in assessing the values for qi (i.e.
the value indicating how far a given requirement is from the
ideal fulfilment) we propose to base the assessment on a
set of questions based on a Likert scale [9]. A Likert scale
is a psychometric scale commonly involved in research that
employs questionnaires where the questions are to be answered
from best to worst on a scale of n steps, where n is an odd
integer number.
If the questionnaire to be filled out by an assessor is
designed so that each qi corresponds to one question on a
Likert scale we propose to use a function e that takes the
response q˜i ∈ N for 0 ≤ q˜i ≤ n − 1 as an argument. We use
two approaches to express the qi.
1) Linear Approach:
qi = eα(q˜i) =
q˜i
n− 1 (2)
2) Logarithmic Approach:
qi = eβ(q˜i) = logn (q˜i + 1) (3)
Using the logarithmic approach leaves less impact of bad
values than the linear approach. There are some caveats on
using a logarithmic function for values on a Likert scale, as
noted by Nevill and Lane [10]. Particularly, the values on the
Likert scale should express a continuous and rather equidistant
increase of quality.
3) Other Methods: In case the questionnaires are designed
in a way that several independent questions result in one value
for qi, Bayesian networks developed by Perl and Russell [11]
can be employed. However, we consider the design of the
questionnaires and the use of Bayesian networks as future
work. Note also that for Bayesian networks more data from
an assessment are necessary than for the above mentioned
methods.
While the Likert scale is useful for assessing opinions on
a psychometric scale, i.e., subjective data, we need, as well,
be able to assess objective data. In these cases, we set up a
scale where discrete choices on a questionnaire are mapped
to a similar scale as the Likert scale to reflect the quantity
of data based on an objective value. This type of creating
assessment data is quite common for assessments, such as
in the estimation of the quality of software products in the
OpenBRR [12].
When objective data are used as input, e.g., as the result of
measurements, these data on a continuous scale can be mapped
into the value range 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1 and used in Eq. 1. Note,
however, that the mapping function not necessarily ought to
be linear, and a specific assessment phase may be necessary
to develop a suitable function that maps the values into the
value range 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1.
4) Assessment by Subject Panels: For an assessment often
several individuals are put into an assessment panel. These
subjects perform the assessment individually while the results
are put together into one assessment result. Further work needs
to show whether it is more practicable to calculate individual q
values and then calculate some mean value of these or whether
to calculate mean values for each q˜i.
D. Finding Useful Thresholds
[tbd.]
III. EXTENDED GENERIC MODEL FOR EHEALTH
SCENARIOS
In the following sections, we develop the scenarios of the
ASSET project and show how storylines can be extracted. We
also underline the role of the storyline in the assessment of
adaptive security techniques for eHealth. Before delving into
the details of scenario and storyline engineering, we highlight
the major properties that a scenario should have in order to
be useful for adaptive security.
Patient monitoring systems are a major data source in
healthcare environments. During the last decade, the develop-
ment of pervasive computing architectures based on the IoT
has consistently improved the efficiency of such monitoring
systems thereby introducing new use cases and requirements.
It is important that these monitoring systems maintain a certain
level of availability, QoS, and that they are secure and protect
the privacy of the patient. Previously, we have analysed the
security and privacy for patient monitoring systems with an
emphasis on wireless sensor networks [13] and suggested
a framework for providing privacy, security, adaptation, and
QoS in patient monitoring systems [14]. We divided patient
monitoring systems into four Generic Levels (GLs): (0) the
patient; (I) the personal sensor network; (II) devices in the
closer environment following several scenarios; and (III) the
healthcare information system.
In this work, we extend the generic model presented by
Leister et al. [14] by the definition of three new levels related
to the monitoring of chronic diseases, the communication
between multiple healthcare providers, and the communi-
cation between healthcare providers and medical research
institutions, respectively. Consequently, the extended generic
model is composed of five levels numbered from (0) to (IV)
Fig. 3: Generic eHealth framework indicating the use cases in
five levels (Extended from [13]).
depending on the logical distance to the patient to whom
Level (0) is assigned. Multiple types are considered at Level
(II). Note that only one of these types applies at a time.
However, it must be possible to switch between the types in
Level (II) depending on the activity of the patient. To this
purpose, the communication between Levels (II) and (III) is
two-way. The key levels of our extended generic model are as
follows, as shown in Fig. 3:
(0) Patient. This is the actual patient.
(I) Personal sensor network. The personal sensor net-
work denotes the patient and the sensors measuring
the medical data. These sensors are connected to each
other in a WBSN. While this sensor network can
be connected randomly, in most cases one special
WBSN node is appointed to be a Personal Cluster
Head (PCH), which forwards the collected data out-
side the range of the WBSN.
(IIa) Smart home. The patient is in a smart-home envi-
ronment where the personal sensor network interacts
with various networks and applications within this
environment. The smart home infrastructure might
be connected to a healthcare enterprise infrastructure
using long-distance data communication.
(IIb) Mobility. The patient is mobile, e.g., using public
or personal transportation facilities. The personal
sensor network of the patient is connected to the
infrastructure of a healthcare enterprise via a mobile
device, e.g., a mobile Internet connection.
(IIc) Paramedic. The WBSN is connected to the medical
devices of an ambulance (car, plane, and helicopter)
via the PCH. The devices of the ambulance can work
autonomously, showing the patient status locally.
Alternatively, the devices of the ambulance can com-
municate with an external healthcare infrastructure,
e.g., at a hospital.
(IId) Intensive care/surgery. During an operation the
sensor data are transferred to the PCH or directly
to the hospital infrastructure over a relatively short
distance. The sensors are in a very controlled envi-
ronment, but some sensors might be very resource
limited due to their size, so extra transport nodes
close to the sensors might be needed.
(IIe) Pre- and postoperative. During pre- and postoper-
ative phases of a treatment, and for use in hospital
bedrooms, the sensor data are transferred from the
sensor network to the PCH and then to the healthcare
information system.
(IIf) Chronic disease treatment. The WBSN data are
used by healthcare personnel in non-emergency treat-
ment of individual patients with a chronic disease.
(III) Healthcare information system. This is considered
a trusted environment. It consists of the hospital
network, the computing facilities, databases, and
access terminals in the hospital.
(IVa) Inter-healthcare provider. Information is shared
between different healthcare providers concerning
medical information of an individual patient.
(IVb) Healthcare provider and research. Information is
shared between healthcare providers and medical
research organisations for the purposes of research,
new solutions development, etc.
A. The Structure of the Scenarios
Through the potential interactions between these levels,
notice that the model can support the elaboration of multiple
scenarios where the actors interact by switching from a level
to another. The scenarios in healthcare using biomedical
sensor networks are quite complex. Therefore, they need to
be efficiently structured. We consider three main scenarios
(hereafter denoted as overall scenarios) and we decompose
them into sub-scenarios (hereafter denoted as core scenarios).
A particular interest is given to the transitions between the core
scenarios since these transitions constitute substantial sources
of threats. For ASSET, we consider a home scenario (A) shown
in Fig. 4, a hospital scenario (B) shown in Fig. 6, as well as
an emergency scenario (C).
Each of these overall scenarios contain a set of core scenar-
ios which are denoted by the scenario identifier A, B, or C,
followed by a dash and the core scenario numbering in roman
number minuscules. The transitions between these core scenar-
ios model the interaction between the various components of
the patient monitoring system. In this paper, we focus mostly
on the Home Scenario (A) where the patient is supposed to
be monitored outside the hospital while performing normal
daily actions. However, to extract useful technical cases for the
evaluation phase we need to structure the scenario according
to the patient’s actions and situation.
TABLE I shows a list of core scenarios used in our work,
which overall scenario they belong to, and which transitions
are useful. Note that other transitions are theoretically possible,
but these are either unlikely or can be achieved by combining
a series of transitions, e.g., taking the Core Scenario iii as an
intermediate for Overall Scenario A. Omitting unlikely tran-
sitions helps to reduce the number of states when modelling
TABLE I: Overview of core scenarios. • indicates that this
core scenario is included in the overall scenario. ◦ indicates
that this core scenario is related to the overall scenario.
scenario transition to
core scenario & name A B C core scenario
i home monitoring • iii, xv
ii home diabetes • i, iii
iii moving • i, iv, v, ix, vii, vi
iv public transport • iii
v vehicle transport • ◦ iii
vi shop • iii
vii cafe´ • iii
viii doctor’s office • iii, xv
ix waiting room • • viii, x, iii
x diagnosis • • xi, xii, xiii, iii
xi operation • xii
xii intensive care • xiii
xiii observation • iii, xii, x
xiv accident • xv
xv ambulance ◦ ◦ • x
the scenarios.
B. The Structure of the Home Scenario
The Home Scenario (A) envisages that a monitored patient
can be in various contexts performing normal daily actions.
For example, for a patient with diabetes the following situa-
tions apply:
• The patient is at home or a nursing home using monitor-
ing equipment.
• The patient uses sensors and communicates electronically
with the doctor’s office.
• The patient uses specific monitoring equipment for dia-
betes.
• The patient visits the doctor’s office regularly and uses
public transport or a car to get there.
• At the waiting room the patient can communicate data to
the health care infrastructure of the doctor’s office.
• The patient regularly takes walking or jogging trips.
• The patient regularly visits a cafe´ with friends; this
includes walking or commuting with public transport.
• In case of an emergency or planned surgery, the patient
may be sent to a hospital with an ambulance.
This list of situations is not yet a useful narrative. It
needs to be structured and enriched with the specific context
information, such as the necessary devices of the IoT, the
communication channels, and actions of the involved actors.
This is done in the core scenarios that describe a specific part
of an overall scenario; e.g., a situation a patient experiences.
Each core scenarios can be part of several overall scenarios.
1) Home Situation (monitored at home) (A-i): Biomedical
sensors are employed in an environment where the patient is
at home or in a nursing home. The patient is monitored by a
WBSN, and the sensor data and alarms can be transmitted to
medical centres and emergency dispatch units.
Here, the sensors might not be monitoring or transmitting
the physiological patient data continuously in order to reduce
A-ii
home s.
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A-i
home
situation
A-iii
moving
A-vi
shop
A-vii
cafe´
visit
A-xv
ambu-
lance
A-iv
publ.
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A-v
vehicle
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A-ix
waiting
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A-viii
doctor’s
office
B
B B
Fig. 4: The Home Scenario with the underlying core scenarios
and their transitions.
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Fig. 5: The detail-scenarios of the home-situation.
battery power consumption. Depending on a predefined al-
gorithm, abnormal sensor data from certain sensors may be
used to activate other sensors autonomously before an alarm
is triggered, and sent to a central monitoring unit. In this
scenario, the following characteristics are given:
1) Ease of use and non-intrusiveness are important issues.
2) Very low power consumption, enabling a long life span
of the batteries, is required.
3) A network infrastructure is available, such as access to
the Internet via LAN, WLAN, or mobile networks.
4) Limited mobility, handoff is possible, but infrequent.
Core Scenario A-i could be split up into several sub-
scenarios, if necessary, depending on the patient’s activities,
time of the day, etc. These sub-scenarios may include sleeping,
watching TV, kitchen work, or other household activities.
We created a specialised scenario for patients living at home
with diabetes monitoring (A-ii). The patient uses a smartphone
with a health-diary software that also implements personal
health records (PHR) and stores measurements. The measure-
ments are performed using special devices that communicate
with a smartphone using Bluetooth. [does not fit:] Note that
such specialisations also could be described as a part of the
storyline of a separate core scenario.
On a regular basis, the patient transmits measurements
to the doctor’s office, thus synchronising the PHR with the
hospital information system; the patient also has an audio-
/video-conversation where medical questions are discussed.
During these sessions the patient might take pictures with the
smart phone camera or perform other measurements.
2) Moving (Walking and Jogging) Scenario (A-iii): The
patient does daily training, i.e., jogs in the nearby park, or
does shorter walks from the home to the public transport, to
the cafe´, shop, or doctor’s office. A common feature in these
situations is that the patient needs to use a smartphone as a
device that collects sensor data, using the mobile networks
to transmit the data. When walking or jogging in the park
many other people and their devices might interfere with the
communication of the smartphone.
When walking in the woods, there might be several spots
which are not covered by a mobile network. In this case,
the signal is so weak that only emergency calls from another
provider can be done. While data traffic is not possible, SMS
messages can be used to send data with very low bandwidth,
possibly after several retries. For an average walking trip, this
outage may last for some minutes.
3) Transport Scenarios: Core Scenario A-iv presents a
situation where a patient commutes to a doctor’s office or
to a cafe´ using public transport. Here, the patient needs
to use a smartphone as a device that collects sensor data,
using the mobile networks to transmit the data. Blind spots
without connectivity to a mobile network, roaming, varying
data transmission quality, etc., are parts of this scenario. This
scenario can be applied to long-distance trains, planes, etc.
Core Scenario A-v represents the scenario where a patient
uses his own or another’s (private) car to commute to a shop,
a cafe´, or the doctor’s office. Here, the patient needs to use
a smartphone as a device that collects sensor data, using the
mobile networks or networks installed or used in the car to
transmit the data. Blind spots without connectivity to a mobile
network, roaming, varying data transmission quality, etc., are
parts of this scenario.
4) Cafe´ Scenario (A-vii): The patient visits a cafe´. Here,
the patient needs to use a smartphone as a device that collects
sensor data, using mobile networks or cafe´’s WLAN zone
for data transfer. Switching between the WLAN and mobile
networks may occur, the WLAN might be of varying quality,
many other cafe´ visitors may interfere, or the WLAN might
not actually be connected to the Internet.
5) Doctor’s Office Scenario (A-viii): The patient is in the
doctor’s office, usually after some time in a waiting room
(A-ix). Here, the patient can have extra sensors attached.
These extra sensors, as well as the existing sensors, can
communicate with the doctor’s infrastructure either through
the smartphone of the patient, or directly, depending on the
needs. A doctor can change a sensor’s characteristics, which
requires the possibility to re-program the sensor devices.
6) Waiting Room Scenario (A-ix): The patient is in a
waiting room at a doctor’s office or a hospital. Patients that are
known to the healthcare system can be connected from their
smartphone to the healthcare network; here, specific actions
for collecting data from the device or other preparations can
be performed. Once the patient is in the range of the waiting
room, the smartphone can transfer large amounts of stored
patient data directly to the infrastructure of the medical centre
via short-range communication, instead of using long-range
mobile communication.
7) Other scenarios: In the scenario structure we foresee
that the patient can undergo a transition to other core scenarios
in a different overall scenario in order to cover situations that
else would be outside the scenario structure. For instance, a
patient could get ill and be brought to a hospital in an ambu-
lance (B-xv) or an emergency situation happens (Scenario C).
Note that the use of devices in the IoT could be different
in Scenarios A, B, and C: as an example, in an emergency
situation the use of one of the patient’s own sensors would
not be possible in all cases.
C. The Structure of the Hospital Scenario
In Scenario B the biomedical sensors are used in a hospital
environment. Here, the patient is located in an operating room
(OR) or intensive care unit (ICU) while undergoing intensive
monitoring of vital physiological parameters. Additional sen-
sors might be required during this procedure to monitor other
physiological parameters. The patient may be moved between
different rooms during the treatment, e.g., from the OR to the
ICU, but monitoring must continue uninfluenced by this. The
sensor data may need to be transferred over different wireless
networks. The system should be able to cope with breakdown
in sensor nodes, new software updates, wireless network traffic
congestion, and interferences with other wireless networks and
biomedical devices.
In Scenario B a fixed network infrastructure is available
between Levels (II) and (III) which can be accessed by the
sink nodes of the biomedical sensor network. The scenario
includes a complex communication environment. Interference
from co-existing wireless networks, mobile networks, and
various medical facilities is possible; this may reduce the
performance of the transmission. While the network topology
in this scenario is fixed, changes to the network topology may
happen while patients are moving or being moved from one
place to another, possibly causing handoffs to other gateways.
On the other hand, roaming to other networks is not part of
this scenario in order to stay within the hospital domain.
Note that scenarios that seem to be similar in Scenario B
and in Scenario A might have differences that might not
be obvious. Thus, one cannot use reasoning performed in
one scenario in another uncritically, without checking the
context and other conditions. For instance, A-viii (doctor’s
office) could be different from a rather similar situation in
a hospital (B-x) since the hospital is connected to a different
kind of network infrastructure. Usually, the primary healthcare
points (doctor’s office) and hospitals have different security
requirements and regimes.
1) Hospital Diagnosis Scenario (B-x): The patient is exam-
ined; extra sensors are attached, and existing sensors on the
patient might be accessed both directly and via the patient’s
smartphone. In addition, NFC tags are used to identify objects.
The medical personnel can re-configure and re-program the
sensors during diagnosis.
2) Hospital Operation Scenario (B-xi): The patient is under
surgery; extra sensors are attached, and existing sensors on
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Fig. 6: The Hospital Scenario with the underlying core sce-
narios and their transitions.
the patient are accessed directly by the hospital system rather
than through the smartphone of the patient. In this scenario,
the QoS is set very high, while security-wise the sensors are
in a protected zone. The medical personnel can re-program
the sensors during the operation.
3) Hospital Intensive Care Scenario (B-xii): The patient is
in intensive care after an operation. Extra sensors are attached,
and existing sensors on the patient might be accessed both
through the patient’s smartphone, and directly through the
hospital infrastructure. In addition, NFC tags are used to
identify objects. In most cases, the smartphone will be used
as PCH. The medical personnel can re-program the sensors
during intensive care.
4) Hospital Observation Scenario (B-xiii): The patient is in
a room under “normal” observation; in contrast to the home
situation, the patient’s smartphone has direct access to the
hospital systems and will deliver data directly with higher QoS
through the secured hospital systems.
D. The Structure of the Emergency Scenario
The Emergency Scenario (C) presents an emergency situ-
ation where victims are provided with sensors, patients are
transported with an ambulance (car, helicopter, plane) and de-
livered to the emergency reception at a hospital. In Scenario C
the use of sensors is not planned beforehand, health personnel
must improvise, the identity of the patient might be unknown,
and the infrastructure might be partially unavailable. Despite
of this, the expectation is that severely injured patients are
stabilised and survive the transport to the emergency reception
in the best condition possible.
We include the first scenario of the Hospital Scenario, the
diagnosis phase when the patient arrives in Core Scenario C-x.
Here, the rather unplanned interventions at the emergency site
are adapted to the routines at the hospital.
1) Accident Site Scenario (C-xiv): This scenario is a disas-
ter and accident response scenario where biomedical sensors
are deployed to measure values like blood pressure, temper-
ature, pulse and ECG in an ad-hoc network at the site of
an accident. Wired or wireless communications infrastructures
may be damaged or unavailable, and a large number of
severely injured people might overwhelm the emergency field
personnel. This could prevent them from providing efficient
and effective emergency rescue. Biomedical sensor networks
can be quickly deployed to monitor vital signs. A large number
of injured can be monitored simultaneously.
In this scenario, the following characteristics are given:
1) The sensor network must operate autonomously, and
needs a high degree of self-organisation. The network
topology is highly dynamic. Therefore, the sensor nodes
should be able to discover each other and setup a sensor
network autonomously.
2) A fixed network infrastructure is not available; data
transferred from Level (II) to Level (III) must use a
mobile network or other specific wireless network, such
as microwave, or digital trunk communication.
3) The radio link might be unstable and the radio link quality
might vary. Additionally, the communication environment
is rather complex, since many sensor nodes may be
deployed in a small area, possibly causing severe channel
competition.
4) High degree of mobility. Handoffs are possible and might
be frequent.
5) Blue-light functionality. That is, being able to re-use
sensors on short notice with high flexibility (short-cutting
some of the usual procedures).
2) Ambulance Scenario (C-xv): The patient is in an am-
bulance. The sensors on the patient are connected to the
ambulance’s information system, which is connected to a
hospital infrastructure via a mobile network connection. The
communication between the patient’s sensors is either directly
to the ambulance infrastructure, or via the mobile phone. The
ambulance and the patient’s mobile phone might use different
carriers. Some properties in this scenario are common with
Scenario v (vehicle transport).
Note that once the patient is inside the ambulance, sensors
should communicate with devices in the ambulance without
involving the mobile carrier.
IV. STORYLINES FOR THE SCENARIOS
The set of overall scenarios, core scenarios, and transitions
can be used to create storylines that can be used as case
studies in ASSET. We present the storylines developed for
the Scenarios A and B. Parts of these storylines will be used
in the following analysis to evaluate the diverse functions in
the IoT. We have not yet developed a storyline for Scenario C.
A. Storyline for the Home Scenario
We developed the storyline for the home scenario as follows:
Petra has both a heart condition and diabetes. In a hospital,
she had two sensors placed in her body: one heart sensor and
one blood sugar sensor. In addition, she uses external sensors
to measure blood pressure, heart beat, inertial sensors, etc., as
well as a camera. Petra is living in her home that has been
prepared for the monitoring system and is commissioned with
the necessary data connections so that her vital signs can be
periodically reported to the healthcare personnel in levels (II)
(nurse or doctor) or (III) (patient records) as introduced in
Fig. 3; several technologies can be applied to achieve this.
The patient monitoring system is set up so that the sensor
data are transmitted wirelessly (several transmission technolo-
gies are possible) to a smartphone that acts as PCH. The PCH
communicates with the hospital infrastructure (Level (III)).
1. Petra is now being monitored at home but data is acquired
remotely (A-i); the following requirements are important:
a. Petra wants her data to remain confidential from neigh-
bours, i.e., people close-by, but outside her home;
b. Petra wants her data to remain confidential from visitors,
i.e., people inside her home.
2. Petra takes a bath in her home (planned sensor acquisition
disruption; A-i);
a. the sensors are water-proof; the PCH is close enough to
receive signals;
b. the sensors need to be removed;
i. a change in the values implicitly indicates the sensor
removal; or
ii. patient must notify the PCH about the sensors going
off-line;
3. Petra is sleeping and sensors fall off (unplanned sensor
acquisition disruption; A-i).
4. Petra leaves her home for training outdoors or a stroll in
the park nearby (A-iii);
a. she is walking alone with her sensors communicating to
the PCH;
b. she meets an acquaintance, Linda who has similar sensor
equipment; note that Petra’s sensors could communicate
through Linda’s sensor network; they continue walking
together;
c. when they walk further, Petra looses the communication
channel to the health care institution because of the
terrain; should she connect through the open, mobile
WLAN-zones that are offered or should she use Linda’s
PCH as communication channel?
5. Petra leaves her home to visit her friends in a cafe´ (A-vii,
A-iii, A-iv, A-v).
6. Petra visits her regular doctor for a check-up; the doctor’s
office is in walking distance from her home (A-iii, A-viii,
A-ix).
7. Petra becomes ill and is transported by an emergency
ambulance to the hospital (B-xv); transition to the Overall
Hospital Scenario B.
B. Storyline for the Hospital Scenario
We developed the storyline for the hospital scenario as
follows: Petra has both a heart condition and diabetes. One
year ago, she had two sensors placed in her body: one heart
sensor and one blood sugar sensor that both communicate
wirelessly. In addition, she uses external sensors to measure
blood pressure, heart beat, inertial sensors, etc., as well as
a camera. Petra suddenly gets ill while being at home. This
is detected by the patient monitoring system installed at her
home.
1. Petra is taken in an ambulance to the hospital (B-xv). In
addition to the sensors she is using, the paramedics use
EEG and ECG sensors. The information from all sensors
is available in the ambulance from three possible sources:
a. information received directly from the sensors, available
on the displays in the ambulance;
b. information received from the PCH that Petra is using;
c. information received from the healthcare records.
2. After the ambulance arrives at the hospital, Petra is moved
to a room where diagnosis of her condition is performed
(B-x). Different sensors are used to find out her condition.
These sensors are removed after diagnosis.
3. It becomes clear that Petra needs to undergo surgery (B-
xi). During surgery sensors are used to measure certain
biomedical values. However, the medical procedure also
creates electromagnetic noise in the same band as the data
transmission between sensors is ongoing.
4. After the surgery, Petra is moved to intensive care (B-
xii) where a variety of sensors are used to observe her
biomedical values.
5. After two days, Petra is moved to a recovery room with
three other patients to allow time for her surgery wound to
heal and for observation (B-xiii). In addition to the heart
and blood sugar sensors, two additional sensors are now
used, but these will be removed after the observation phase
is over. The two other patients in the same room are using
the same kind of sensors.
a. The sensors Petra is using transmit their readings to her
PCH.
b. The additional sensors Petra is using transmit their
readings to a base station in the patients’ room, while
her ordinary sensors are reporting to her PCH.
6. Petra is discharged from hospital; transition to Overall
Scenario A.
C. Applying the Storylines
[tbd. – note: needs to be adjusted in the light of new
research presented in this paper.] To conduct an efficient
threat analysis of these storylines, we apply security objectives
introduced by Savola and Abie [15] and Savola et al. [16],
who stated that adaptive security decision-making should adapt
requirements for privacy and data confidentiality based on
the data processing needs, roles of stakeholders, regulations
and legislation, and the privacy level of data indicated by
privacy metrics. For example, the security requirement pointed
out in Step 1.a of the storyline is related to confidential-
ity and privacy, which are often emphasised in healthcare.
Strong confidentiality algorithms, key distribution, associated
processes, and compliance to appropriate privacy legislation
and regulations are crucial.
V. EVALUATING THE HOME SCENARIO
[new.] We use selected parts of Scenario A to illustrate
with some examples how to use the ASSET framework. We
go through the scenario description, and comment on the use
of the framework. Note, however, that the numerical values
are for illustration purposes. These values are based on rough
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Fig. 7: Visualising the result for confidentiality and observ-
ability. The dark blue bars represent the results using the
logarithmic function eβ while the light blue bars represent
the results using the linear function eα.
estimates instead of a careful assessment. Different methods
for assessment were proposed above in Section II-C, but
applying and evaluating the different methods reamin future
work.
A. Confidentiality and Observability
In the storyline of the Home Scenario Petra is monitored
at home with the requirement that she wants her data to
be confidential for people inside and outside her home. Let
us assume that the properties of data observability and data
confidentiality are essential in this first case, i.e., are in S.
Here, data observability means that a third party can observe
the signal sent from a device and, thus, deduct the existence
of this device and some meta-data. For instance, neighbours
of Petra might observe the signals from her sensors and
make assumptions about her health conditions from this. As
countermeasures the apartment could be shielded or the signal
strength of the sensors could be reduced. While shielding
the apartment is too expensive, reducing the signal strength,
however, could have an impact on the data availability since
some corners in Petra’s apartment wound not be covered.
Data confidentiality means that a third party cannot interpret
the received signals. Cryptographic methods and authentica-
tion are often used to assure data confidentiality. Counter-
measures when threats occur could be the use of a different
cryptographic method or authentication protocol. However,
using a different cryptographic method could have a negative
impact on the performance or battery consumption.
For a numeric example we use the following variables: qS1
is the value for observability inside the apartment; qS2 is the
value for observability outside the apartment; qS3 is the value
for confidentiality; qS4 is the value for availability; qQ1 is the
value for bandwidth; qQ2 is the value for battery consumption;
and qC are other mitigation costs. recall that the value of
qi indicates how far a given requirement is from the ideal
fulfilment, where 1 is complete fulfilment of the requirement.
We use the following cases: I) the base case, i.e., the apartment
is not shielded, rather simple encryption algorithms and au-
thentication protocols are used, and sensors transmit at normal
power; II) shielding the apartment; III) reducing transmission
power; IV) using different encryption algorithm; and V) using
different authentication protocol.
As outlined in in Section II-B, for objective assessment we
need to establish a scale using n steps similarly to the Likert
TABLE III: The 11-value scale for q˜S2 of Example 1
q˜S2 Description
10 not observable outside apartment
9 barely observable in adjacent apartments; cannot be inter-
preted
8 barely observable in adjacent apartments; need advanced
equipment to interpret
7 observable in parts of adjacent apartments, but not beyond
6 well observable in adjacent apartments, but not beyond
5 observable in range > 30m; on street
4 observable in range > 50m on street
3 observable in range > 100m on street
2 observable on street from running car
1 observable through wide-range network
0 n/a
scale. For an example, we present a possible scale for the
requirement q˜S2 (observability outside apartment) on a scale
with 11 values in TABLE III. The value of q˜S2 = 0 is marked
as not applicable to indicate that for observability outside
the appartment no situation is considered totally inacceptable.
Note that marking q˜S2 = 0 implies q = 0 for this alternative.
In an experiment, we assessed the values for q˜Si=1...4 ,
q˜Qi=1...2 , and q˜QC by using a rough estimate. We also assigned
values for the weights wi using intuition; we are aware that
these values need to be assessed more thoroughly at a later
stage. The assessment values, weights, and results for qˆi and
qtotal are shown in TABLE II for the logarithmic approach
from Eq. 3. We also applied the linear approach from Eq. 2 to
the same data. Both results for qtotal are visualised in Fig. 7.
In our example we see that the logarithmic approach and the
linear approach show similar behaviour with respect to ranking
the alternatives. However, the logarithmic approach results in
higher values and less differences the values in-between. In
this particular example, a combination of cases IV and V gives
the best result while case II delivers the lowest result, which
is reasonable.
B. Assessment of Changes in Time
As a second example we use the part of the storyline where
Petra is taking a stroll in the park. We assume that her sensors
are connected wirelessly to her smartphone in its function as
a PCH, and the PCH is communicating through a wireless
network with the health care infrastructure through a public
wireless network offered by a telephony provider. Further, we
assume that her smartphone can connect using WLAN.
In this example, we use different definitions for qS1 and qS1
by using the observability of the sensors and the PCH, respec-
tively. We take into account effects for long-range networks
that indicate that battery consumption is higher when the signal
strength from the base station is weak or the connection is lost.
For a numeric example we use the following variables: qS1
is the value for observability of the sensors; qS2 is the value for
observability of the PCH; qS3 is the value for confidentiality;
qS4 is the value for availability; qQ1 is the value for bandwidth;
qQ2 is the value for battery consumption; and qC are other
mitigation costs. We use the following cases from the storyline
of Scenario A: I) walking alone in the park; II) meeting Linda;
TABLE II: Example for applying the ASSET framework using the logarithmic approach from Eq. 3
S1 S2 S3 S4 Q1 Q2 C qtotal
wi 0.4 0.8 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0
∑
= 7.4
q˜ qˆ q˜ qˆ q˜ qˆ q˜ qˆ q˜ qˆ q˜ qˆ q˜ qˆ qtotal
Case I 6 0.997 8 0.991 8 0.977 10 1.000 10 1.000 10 1.000 10 1.000 0.965
Case II 6 0.997 10 1.000 8 0.977 10 1.000 10 1.000 10 1.000 1 0.846 0.824
Case III 7 0.998 9 0.996 8 0.977 9 0.995 8 0.988 10 1.000 10 1.000 0.954
Case IV 6 0.997 8 0.991 10 1.000 10 1.000 8 0.988 9 0.992 10 1.000 0.968
Case V 6 0.997 8 0.991 9 0.989 10 1.000 9 0.995 10 1.000 10 1.000 0.972
Case III+IV 6 0.997 9 0.996 10 1.000 10 1.000 9 0.995 10 1.000 10 1.000 0.987
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Fig. 8: Visualising the result for Example 2. The dark blue
bars represent the results using the logarithmic function eβ
while the light blue bars represent the results using the linear
function eα.
TABLE IV: Example 2 for applying the ASSET framework
using the logarithmic approach from Eq. 3
qi S1 S2 S3 S4 Q1 Q2 C qtotal
wi 1 1 2 1 1 1.5 1
∑
= 8.4
Case I 7 6 8 9 8 9 10 0.919
Case II 7 6 4 9 8 9 9 0.850
Case III 7 5 4 1 1 8 9 0.633
Case IV 7 5 3 9 7 7 8 0.789
Case V 7 6 4 9 6 8 8 0.827
III) loosing connection; IV) connect to open, mobile WLAN;
and V) using Linda’s PCH as communication channel.
In an experiment, as above, we assessed the values for
q˜Si=1...4 , q˜Qi=1...2 , and q˜C by using a rough estimate and
assigned values for the weights wi using intuition. The assess-
ment values q˜i, weights, and qtotal are shown in TABLE IV
for the logarithmic approach from Eq. 3. We also applied the
linear approach from Eq. 2 to the same data. Both results for
qtotal are visualised in Fig. 8.
In this example we see how the security situation changes
due to changes of the context (I–II–III), i.e., when Petra meets
Linda or Petra looses connection. This example also shows
that the assessment can give a hint which one of two possible
actions (IV or V) would promise a better security situation.
VI. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO ADAPTIVE SECURITY
[new.] Abie and Balasingham [2] define the term adaptive
security as “a security solution that learns, and adapts to chang-
ing environment dynamically, and anticipates unknown threats
without sacrificing too much of the efficiency, flexibility, relia-
bility, and security of the IoT system”. Abie and Balasingham
present the Adaptive Risk MAnagement (ARM) framework
that is based on a feedback loop known from cybernetics
[17] with the five measures (i) identify, (ii) analyse, (iii) plan,
(iv) track, and (v) control. This results in four steps in the
Fig. 9: The Adaptive Security concept, adapted for the IoT by
Abie [19].
adaptation loop, aligned to ISO/IEC 27005:2008 [7] and the
Plan–Do–Check–Act (PDCA) model of ISO/IEC 27001:2005
[18].
Abie [19] presented a functional description on the concept
of adaptive security for a message-oriented infrastructure;
he adapted this concept to the IoT, as shown in Fig. 9,
and identified the following functionality to be essential for
adaptive security to be implemented: a) being self-aware using
a feedback loop and a history database; b) being context-
aware using sensors and feedback from other nodes in the IoT;
c) using security metrics to process the data from the sensors
and the other nodes; d) using risk and threat estimation and
prediction; e) using security metrics as defined by Savola et al.
[16]; f ) using methods such as Bayesian networks [20], game
theory, Markov chains, etc. to support the threat estimation
and prediction; g) using a decision making module to enforce
appropriate security and privacy level; and h) communicating
data to other nodes in the IoT.
In the adaptive security concept, the Monitor receives data
from sensors and other sources that are further used in the
Analyzer/Learner to make adaptive decisions. In this context,
the ASSET Evaluation framework can be used to provide
the ground truth data a) to train the learning algorithms
employed in the evaluation loop, and b) to evaluate whether
the behaviour of the adaptive algorithms is reasonable.
For this we follow the following recipe: We use the story-
lines similarly as done in Section V where we calculate the
q-values for all useful cases that can appear for this storyline.
Further, we use multiple tools such as implementation in a lab
[21], simulation, and formal reasoning [22]. [tbd.] Here, the
scenarios and storylines can be connected to the arrangements,
which are sets of configuration settings that influences how
the formal model operates. Moreover, the properties of a
model checker can directly be extracted from the requirements
generated from the scenarios.
For the purpose of learning, for all states we retrieve the
measurements from the sensors, the context, the assessed q-
values, transition to the next desirable state, and desirable
output are used as input for the learning algorithm. Thus,
the assessed data using the evaluation framework and the
measured sensor data are tied together.
For the purpose of evaluating the behaviour of the network,
the storylines can used as shown in Section V. After the
assessment is finished, one starts with a start-state and uses
either an implementation in a lab, a real implementation, or
a simulation to perform rounds in the adaptation loop. The
assessed values from the evaluation framework are compared
with the behaviour of the adaptation algorithm and evaluated.
the goal is to get a behaviour of the adaptation loop that is
close to the “right” decisions deducted from the assessment.
More on how such evaluations can be performed is shown in
a framework presented by Leister et al. [22].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
[tbd.: update.] We highlighted the role of the scenarios
in the assessment framework for IoT-based adaptive security
solutions in eHealth. This is based on a generic system model,
the requirements for eHealth applications, and a generic
assessment framework. The Home Scenario of the ASSET
project covers multiple core scenarios representing various
situations. These address specific requirements related to the
context, the data-communication, the devices, and the actions
of the involved actors. The core scenarios are specific to
the eHealth case, and make it possible to identify relevant
cases that need to be evaluated, such as situations where IoT
devices need to be removed or disconnected, the use of ample
communication channels, or the impact of mobility.
A storyline for a home patient with chronic diseases has
been described and analysed. In the future, the overall sce-
narios, as well as the underlying core scenarios and storylines
will be used in the ASSET project to evaluate the developed
algorithms within adaptive security.
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